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STATE PUNITIVE DAMAGES STATUTES: A
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
Sandra N. Hurd*
Frances E. Zollers**
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued assessment of punitive damages will mean the end of civilization
as we know it. That is the well-orchestrated message of tort reformers and business
lobbies. If the claims about the havoc punitive damages wreak can be believed, then
they are responsible for the loss of competitiveness of U.S. businesses, the inability to
bring life-saving drugs to market, and the financial ruin of major corporations. In op-
position, consumer groups and others claim that the allegations are exaggerated, unsup-
ported by facts, and inappropriately restrict plaintiffs' rights. They cite eye-glazing
studies of numbers and size of awards to counter the assertions of the tort reformers.
The debate is not merely academic discourse. Claims and counterclaims about
the effect of punitive damages are cited to induce major changes in the approach the
law takes to their assessment. The battle raged, for a time, at the U.S. Supreme Court
level. Over five years' time the Court considered three punitive damages actions as
defendants waged constitutional arguments against them. In Browning-Ferris Industries
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.' the Court concluded that punitive damages awards do not vio-
late the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines. However, the Court
virtually invited a challenge based on the due process clause, which was forthcoming
in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.2 In Haslip, the Court held that a puni-
tive damages award handed down by an Alabama jury was reasonable and did not
violate the defendant's due process rights.3 In dicta the Court noted that the award,
which was four times the actual damages, was "close to the line" separating permissi-
ble and impermissible awards.4 Taking a cue from that language, the most recent case,
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,5 challenged as a violation of the
due process clause a punitive award that was over 500 times the compensatory award.
Despite the dicta in Haslip, the Court upheld the award as reasonable under a Haslip
analysis.6 Except to review isolated and unique state law provisions, the Supreme
Court is not likely to engage in extensive review of punitive damages cases in the
foreseeable future.!
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1. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
2. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
3. Id. at 34.
4. Id. at 37.
5. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
6. Id. at 2718.
7. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994). At the end of the 1994 term, the
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The decision in TXO did not put to rest the debate, however. For more than a
decade, the claims of tort reform groups have been made in statehouses across the
country to effect change in the legislative treatment of punitive damages. The lobbying
effort has been largely successful, and many states have amended their common law
statutorily to restrict the assessment of punitive damages. With the TXO outcome, one
can expect a renewed effort to be directed at the state level to work even greater
change in the name of tort reform.
Amid the rhetoric and emotion of the debate about punitive damages, a basic
notion has been lost. The claims of "too many," "too high," and "too often" have
drowned out the original reasons for punitive damages and the role they play in estab-
lishing social norms. The idea behind punitive damages is simple. When actors engage
in truly outrageous civil misconduct, they should be required to pay not only the actual
damages their conduct engenders, but an additional penalty designed to punish their
conduct and to deter them and others from engaging in such conduct in the future.
Although the penalty is paid to the plaintiff, it is not compensation for the harm caused
to the plaintiff. It is an assessment against the maliciousness and wantonness of the
defendant, and is designed to communicate that society will not tolerate such behavior.
In the rush to limit or eliminate punitive damages altogether, the idea of punishment
and deterrence seems to have given way to discussions about predictability and econo-
my. Accountability for bad conduct is noticeably absent from the discourse.
In this article we attempt to return to the basic notions of punitive damages.
After reviewing the most recent Supreme Court decision on the subject, we examine
state statutes for their ability to advance the punishment and deterrence policies so
basic to punitive damages. Finally, we propose model legislation that attempts to re-
spond to the concerns of those seeking change, while keeping faith with the historic
tenets of punitive damages.
II. TXO PRODUCTION CORP. v. ALLIANCE RESOURCES CORP.
On June 25, 1993, the United States Supreme Court weighed in yet again on the
punitive damages debate when it announced its decision in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp. In 1985, TXO Production Corp. (TXO) filed a complaint in
a West Virginia court seeking to remove a cloud on title to oil and gas development
rights. Respondent Alliance Resources Corp. (Alliance) counterclaimed for slander of
title. The jury returned a verdict against TXO for $19,000 in actual damages and $10
million in punitive damages. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia affirmed the verdict. The Supreme Court granted certiorari' to review
TXO's claim that the punitive damages award violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip.9 The
Court upheld the award, applying the Haslip reasonableness test."0 The Court's defer-
ence to the state court's analysis will remove federal due process consideration from
Supreme Court issued a decision in Oberg, holding that judicial review of punitive damages, or a
similar procedural safeguard against arbitrariness, is required by the due process clause. The case in-
volved an Oregon state rule, unique to that state, prohibiting judicial review of punitive damages
awarded by a jury. Relying on Haslip, the Court overturned the rule as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
8. 113 S. Ct. 594 (1992).
9. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
10. 113 S. Ct. at 2720-22; See text accompanying note 13.
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most awards of punitive damages, substantially reducing the number of cases that will
be reviewed by the Court. The outcome will return responsibility to the states to articu-
late the standards for punitive damages awards.
The facts of the case reveal an extreme example of nefarious corporate activity.
In 1984, TXO geologists recommended that the company obtain certain oil and gas
development rights controlled by Alliance. Alliance accepted TXO's offer of $20 per
acre and 22% of the oil and gas revenues in royalties, and agreed to assign its interest
in the Tract to TXO. Alliance agreed also to return the purchase price if TXO's attor-
ney determined that title had failed. TXO subsequently advised Alliance that there was
the "distinct possibility or probability" that its title had failed," with full knowledge
that such claim was frivolous. Attempting to lend substance to its claim, TXO obtained
a quitclaim deed from Alliance's predecessor in interest and unsuccessfully tried to
obtain a false affidavit about rights conveyed under an earlier deed. When TXO's
attempt to renegotiate the royalty agreement with Alliance failed, TXO sued. TXO
appealed the jury verdict for Alliance, arguing that the verdict violated its due process
rights.'2 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied the "reasonable rela-
tionship" test of Haslip, considering "(1) the potential harm that TXO's actions could
have caused; (2) the maliciousness of TXO's action; and (3) the penalty necessary to
discourage TXO from undertaking such endeavors in the future."' 3 The West Virginia
court held that each of the factors supported the punitive damages award. 4
In its appeal to the United States Supreme Court, TXO raised substantive and
procedural due process arguments. It argued, first, that the punitive damages award
was so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property. 5 It argued, sec-
ond, that the jury was not adequately instructed on punitive damages, the verdict did
not receive adequate review by either the trial or appellate court, and TXO did not
have advance notice either that the jury could return so large an award or that the jury
could rely on potential harm in calculating the amount of punitive damages. 6
The Supreme Court held that the $10 million punitive damages award was not so
excessive as to be beyond the power of the state to allow." Acknowledging that the
Fourteenth Amendment does impose a limit "beyond which penalties may not go," the
Court rejected both Alliance's proposed rational basis" and TXO's proposed height-
ened scrutiny 9 tests for assessing the constitutionality of punitive damages awards
11. Id. at 2715.
12. Id. at 2717.
13. 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va. 1992).
14. 113 S. Ct. at 2718.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2723.
17. Id. at 2722-23.
18. The test proposed by Alliance is "the same standard of rational basis scrutiny that is appropri-
ate for reviewing state economic legislation." Id. at 2719.
19. TXO asserted that "punitive damage awards should be scrutinized more strictly than legislative
penalties because they are typically assessed without any legislative guidance expressing the considered
judgment of the elected representatives of the community." Id. They proposed a two-step process for
review. In the first step, the court would examine four criteria to determine whether a punitive damag-
es award presumptively violates the fundamental fairness notions inherent in due process:
(1) awards of punitive damages upheld against other defendants in the same jurisdiction,
(2) awards upheld for similar conduct in other jurisdictions,
(3) legislative penalty decisions with respect to similar conduct, and
(4) the relationship of prior punitive awards to the associated compensatory awards.
1994]
Journal of Legislation
and confirmed the Haslip test:
We return to what we said two terms ago in Haslip: "We need not, and indeed we
cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and
the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, however,
that [a] general concer[n] of reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into the constitu-
tional calculus."20
Applying a reasonableness test to the facts of this case, the Court first decided
that the trial court's instruction that allowed the jury to consider potential as well as
actual harm was appropriate. Despite authority to the contrary in a number of states, it
is proper, in determining a punitive damages award, to consider the magnitude of the
potential harm to the intended victims if the scheme had succeeded, as well as possible
harm to others that might result if like conduct is not deterred.2 From the evidence
presented at trial, the jury could well have believed that TXO was seeking a multimil-
lion dollar gain in its share of royalties. In light of the amount of money at stake,
TXO's bad faith, the fact that this conduct was part of a pattern, and TXO's wealth,
the punitive damages award, although large, does not "jar one's constitutional sensibili-
ties. 22
The Supreme Court rejected TXO's procedural due process arguments as well.
First, it found that TXO had failed to raise the issue of the inadequacy of the jury
instructions in state court.23 Second, it found that the reviews by both the trial and
appellate court were adequate. Although the trial court failed to articulate the basis for
denying TXO's post trial motions, the judge indicated from the bench that he agreed
with the jury's appraisal of the egregiousness of TXO's conduct. The appellate court
decision was unanimous and carefully considered relevant precedents, including
Haslip.24 Finally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had held, prior to this
conduct, that a defendant could be liable for punitive damages in the absence of com-
pensatory damages, effectively putting TXO on notice that potential harm may be
considered in determining the amount of punitive damages.25
In spite of the hopes of business interests and tort reformers that the Supreme
Court would adopt a new test for reviewing punitive damages, the Court did not break
new ground with its decision in TXO. In refusing to create a bright line and reaffirm-
ing its Haslip reasonableness test, the Court has effectively limited federal review of
punitive damages awards and moved the debate back to the state level, which contin-
ues to be the scene of legislative wrestling with punitive damages.
In the second step, an arbitrary and excessive award must be struck down unless there is a
compelling and particularized justification for it. Id.
20. Id. at 2720 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
21. Id. at 2721.
22. Id. at 2722 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
23. Id. at 2723.
24. Id. The Wesi Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated:
We have examined all of the punitive damages opinions issued since Haslip was decided
in an attempt to find some pattern in what courts find reasonable. Generally, the cases
fall into three categories: (1) really stupid defendants; (2) really mean defendants; and
(3) really stupid defendants who could have caused a great deal of harm by their actions
but who actually caused minimal harm.
419 S.E.2d at 887-88.
25. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently changed this ruling in Games v.
Fleming Landfill, 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991), but this was after TXO's activities under discussion.
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III. STATE STATUTES
The tort reform movement and the interest in civil justice reform have produced
flurries of state statutes addressing punitive damages, first as a response to the insur-
ance crisis of the 1980s and then again after Haslip. Based on the perception that
punitive damages are out of control, all the statutes limit their assessment, either by
circumstance or amount. As of this writing, more than half of the states have produced
some sort of statutory treatment of punitive damages.' Appendix A displays the
states and the substantive provisions of their statutes. While each is different in scope
and effect, discernible patterns emerge that permit categorization. For purposes of this
discussion we have identified the major categories and discussed representative statutes
under each.
A. Caps and Multipliers
To address the concern that punitive damages awards have become excessive, a
number of states have capped the amount of the award or tied it to the award for com-
pensatory damages. At the extreme, Virginia has placed an absolute dollar limit of
$350,000 on punitive damages awards and permits no exceptions.' More typical is
the Alabama design of enacting a dollar cap' and carving out exceptions for certain
kinds of behavior' and certain kinds of torts.' A third variation is to tie the maxi-
mum permissible punitive damages award to compensatory damages"' or to some
multiplier of the compensatory award, such as four to one,2 often with exceptions for
particular types of cases.33 Probably the most elaborate scheme is found in the Kansas
statute, which prescribes that punitive damages be capped at the lesser of $5 million or
defendant's highest gross annual income earned for any one of the five years immedi-
ately before the act that is the basis of the claim occurred.' A different cap is im-
posed if the court finds that the defendant expected to make a profit in excess of the
previously described cap, in which case damages cannot exceed 1.5 times the expected
profit.
35
It is not possible to state a common figure or multiplier, or even a common set
of exceptions that typify all the statutes. Clearly those states that have imposed some
monetary limit on punitive damages have done so at the urging of tort reform interests
26. See AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AREA (1986-1989), PUNITIVE DAMAGES UPDATE, at 1-3 (Nov. 9, 1989), cited in Stephen Daniels &
Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 5 n.14 (1990); Michael
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damages in Products Liability: A Research Report, 3 PROD. LIAB.
L.J. 85 (1992).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992).
28. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993). The cap is set at $250,000.
29. A pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct and conduct involving actual malice. Id.
30. Libel, slander, and defamation. Id. § 6-11-21(3).
31. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9(A) (West 1987).
32. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1993). Actually, Texas
employs as a cap the greater of $200,000 or four times the compensatory damages.
33. Florida does not invoke its three-to-one multiplier for class actions. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.73(1)(a) (West Supp. 1994). Nevada abandons its three-to-one multiplier for cases involving prod-
uct liability, some types of housing discrimination, toxic spills and emissions, and defamation. NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(2) (Michie Supp. 1991).
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (Supp. 1992).
35. Id. § 60-3701(f) (Supp. 1992).
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who have persuaded state legislators that business competitiveness depends on being
able to predict future liabilities. That no magic number or common plan has emerged
indicates that those states that have acted felt the pressure at different levels of intensi-
ty.
B. Payment to the State
Another criticism leveled at the current state of law is that punitive damages
provide a windfall to the plaintiff.' It is axiomatic that punitive damages do not com-
pensate for any loss the plaintiff suffered; rather they punish and deter the conduct
engaged in by the defendant. When the plaintiff receives that amount in addition to the
actual damages, it is perceived as a bonus. 7 To address the issue of windfall to the
plaintiff, some states have enacted laws that require a percentage of any punitive award
to be paid to the state. The percentages fall in a range from twenty to seventy-five
percent. Some funds are earmarked,3" but most are paid to the general treasury of the
states.39
Colorado passed such a statute, only to have it declared unconstitutional as viola-
tive of the takings clauses of the Colorado and federal constitutions.' Florida and
Georgia courts have upheld similar provisions. In times of diminishing revenues, it
may be tempting for states to enact such provisions. However, in light of the Colorado
decision, all such statutory schemes are called into question.
C. Burden of Proof
A popular reform measure, adopted by many states, is to increase the burden of
proving punitive damages. All of the states that have done so, with the exception of
Colorado, have established the clear and convincing evidence standard to replace proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.42 Colorado went further and now requires proof
36. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward A Principled Approach, 31
HAsTINGs L.J. 639, 644 (1980).
37. Punitive damages are taxable as income; compensatory damages are not.
38. For example, Kansas, in medical malpractice actions, designates the money for health care and
Illinois designates its Department of Rehabilitative Services as the beneficiary. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3402(e) (Supp. 1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, art. 5. § 2-1207 (Michie 1993) (formerly ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Supp. 1990)).
39. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992).
40. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
41. Gordon v. Florida, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Georgia v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga.
1993). In Kirk, the Supreme Court of Colorado could not find that:
[a connection] between, on the one hand, any alleged governmental interest in punishing
and deterring fraudulent, malicious, or willful and wanton tortious conduct and, on the
other, the statutory imposition of the forced contribution on the person injured by the
wrongful conduct; and the gross disproportion between the statutory forced contribution
and any governmental service made available to the judgment creditor but not otherwise
funded by fees and other statutory assessments imposed on civil litigants using the judi-
cial process to resolve their disputes.
818 P.2d at 273.
Florida and Georgia had no similar difficulty. For instance, the court in Gordon said, "The
statute under attack here bears a rational relationship to legitimate legislative objectives: to allot to the
public weal a portion of damages designed to deter future harm to the public and to discourage puni-
tive damage claims by making them less remunerative to the claimant ...." 608 So. 2d at 802.
42. See, e.g.. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West
1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1993). See also Appendix A.
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beyond a reasonable doubt.43 The logic of requiring more proof for punitive damages
than for other damages is to demand that the plaintiff establish forcefully the outra-
geous, often malicious, conduct of which he or she complains. The effect is to reduce
the instances when punitive damages are appropriate, a result desired by the tort re-
formers.
More states have adopted this reform than the others. Variations do exist, as
noted in Appendix A, but most states follow the simple route of unconditionally in-
creasing the burden of proof in all punitive damages cases. Moreover, the list of states
adopting this approach grows longer when one includes those states that have achieved
the same result through judicial decision.'
D. Bifurcated Trials
Although not garnering the same support as the other reform measures, requiring
or permitting bifurcated trials in punitive damages actions has taken hold in a few
states. Generally, the notion is to try the plaintiffs entitlement to punitive damages
first and hold a second hearing to set the amount of the damages.4" The purpose is to
permit the fact finder to consider the caliber of the conduct without being influenced
by information about the profitability of the conduct or the defendant's financial worth.
IV. WHAT'S WRONG WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES REFORM?
It is our assertion that most reform measures taken to date are unnecessary and
misguided. We take issue with both the need for and wisdom of making many of the
legislative changes to the traditional rules for awarding and computing punitive damag-
es. First, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is, as business interests
loudly contend, a crisis, or even a serious problem, in the area of punitive damages.
Second, many of the legislative changes that the states are adopting clearly have the
effect of eliminating or significantly diminishing the deterrence function of awarding
punitive damages, an inappropriate result as long as there are people who engage in
the type of conduct described in TXO. If business interests succeed in their efforts to
prevent punitive damages from serving their historical functions, the incidence of busi-
ness misconduct is likely to rise. In that case, more regulation will inevitably spring
up-regulation that may be more uncertain and unpredictable than the traditional puni-
tive damages rules about which reformers complain.
Criticism of punitive damages has been part of the legal landscape for over a
century.' Most recently, however, because of the alleged insurance crisis of the mid-
1980s and the rise of the civil justice and tort reform movements, the debate has
changed from a legal discussion about the doctrinal merits of punitive damages to a
"highly politicized public policy debate about the alleged negative effects of punitive
damages on American society and the economy."47
Critics contend that punitive damages are routinely awarded, the amounts award-
ed are large, the frequency and size of awards has been rapidly increasing, and the
43. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1989).
44. See Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986); Travelers Indem. Co.
v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
45. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (Harrison 1990).
46. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
47. Daniels & Martin, supra note 26, at 2.
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problem is national in scope.48 A number of systematic, empirical studies have been
conducted on cases yielding punitive damages awards.49 The findings of the clear ma-
jority of these studies do not support the claims made.' For example, an American
Bar Foundation study concludes that juries do not routinely award punitive damages,'l
the awards that are made are "low to modest,"52 there have been no dramatic trends
over time in cases involving physical or financial harm (the only situations for which
there are sufficient data to establish trends), 3 and that there is great variation among
locations in terms of both the number of cases in which punitive damages are awarded
and the amounts of the awards.' Professor Rustad concludes that, at least in product
liability cases, punitive damages awards have not changed in size for twenty-five years
when adjusted for inflation.5 Moreover, when asbestos cases are removed from con-
sideration, punitive damages awards are actually in decline.56 Professor Saks, after
reviewing other studies, asserts that the "results are far more tame than one might have
expected given the impressions created in the minds of the public and policy-mak-
ers." 7 Professor Landes and Judge Posner reviewed cases awarding punitive damages
and found them "generally congruent" with the formal legal standard" and not rou-
tinely awarded in product liability cases, except in cases of aggravation. 9
Although the issue of punitive damages is one that needs further research, the
findings of the studies to date certainly suggest that the label "crisis" is inaccurate.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNrTVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987); GENER-
AL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FIVE STATES
(1989); NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, WHAT ARE TORT AWARDS REALLY LIKE? THE UNTOLD
STORY FROM THE STATE COURTS (1992); Daniels & Martin, supra note 26; Michael Rustad, In De-
fense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1992); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
50. See supra note 49. But see REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES,
EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY (1986), which reviewed federal court cases and determined that punitive damages
awards rose from an average of $63,000 in 1970-74 to $489,000 in 1980-84. Because the vast majori-
ty of punitive damages cases have historically been brought in state courts, an analysis limited to
federal court cases does not yield statistically significant results. TEXACO, INC., PUNITIVE DAMAGES
EXPLOSION: FACT OR FICTION? (1992) shows an increase in total punitive awards in California, Texas,
Illinois, and New York from $800,000 in the 1968-71 time period to $312 million in the 1988-91
time period. This study, conducted in part by Texaco, examines awards in a limited number of states
and includes the $3 billion punitive damages award assessed in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-
05905 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1985).
51. Daniels & Martin, supra note 26, at 17 (the punitive damages rate "never exceeded one-quar-
ter of all successful cases or one-fifth of all cases.").
52. "Fifteen of the twenty [research] sites have median punitive damage awards below $40,000,
thirteen of the sites have median punitive damages awards below $30,000." Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 28 (the data show "relatively low, stable rates ...generally below 10%").
54. Id. at 15 ("This ... finding suggests that sweeping statements about national trends used to
instigate reform should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism.").
55. Rustad, supra note 49, at 49.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Saks, supra note 49, at 1262.
58. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 185
(1987).
59. Id. at 302. The authors also reject the notion that punitive damages are being overused in
product liability law. Id. Furthermore, they find them neither "frequent nor crushing in any absolute
sense . . . ." William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, REG. 33,
54 (September/October 1986).
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One wonders whether the characterization by tort reformers of the punitive damages
system as out of control is anything more than self-serving hyperbole. Whether a crisis
does or does not exist, it is premature to act on the changes demanded by business
interests and tort reformers until it is clear that there is in fact a problem and until the
character and dimension of the problem are much more clearly defined.
Absent convincing evidence of the necessity for limiting punitive damages, it
would be extremely unwise to do so.' Punitive damages have historically served the
critical function of deterring misconduct.6' But, the deterrence function is significantly
compromised, and in many cases eliminated, if it is possible for a potential defendant
to calculate ex ante her or his potential exposure to liability. Imagine, for example, the
executives of TXO deciding whether to attempt to coerce Alliance into renegotiating
the royalty arrangement, knowing that the scheme they were about to undertake was
clearly wrongful. They believe that the profits to be made from convincing Alliance to
reduce its share of the royalties will be substantial. They could, as economically ratio-
nal actors, decide that going forward with the scheme is worth the risk of having to
pay some amount of punitive damages if they are "caught." How differently the deci-
sion-making process may proceed from there if they are in Virginia, where their abso-
lute exposure is $350,000, or if they are in West Virginia, where their exposure is not
limited. Indeed, TXO's claim on appeal that they were not on notice that the jury
could return as large a punitive damages award as it did suggests that they undertook
some form of cost/benefit analysis. A company may well decide, in economic terms, to
risk $350,000 for the sake of making a multimillion dollar profit; it is much less likely
to take that risk when the penalty is unknown and could potentially create a substantial
loss. It is precisely the uncertainty that makes one think again. Indeed, creating predict-
ability in punitive damages may lead to exactly the type of cost/benefit analysis imag-
ined above. It is a type of business decision-making that society should wish to dis-
courage.62
Business interests and tort reformers would be well advised to be careful what
they wish for. In a number of jurisdictions, they have been successful in convincing
legislatures to pass statutes limiting punitive liability. Yet, what will happen when
future instances of horribly egregious business misconduct go essentially unpunished,
or if decreasing levels of deterrence cause an increase in misconduct? There will un-
doubtedly be frenzied calls for more reform directed at clamping down on businesses
that are "out of control," and the overreaction may be as distasteful to businesses as
the 'risis they claim to be facing now. In addition, a significant number of punitive
damages awards come in business on business cases.63 Business interests should con-
sider that the reforms they are seeking also will limit their own ability to sanction
60. We are mindful of Michael Saks's warning that when the models lacking empirical validation
form the basis of reform efforts, the effects may be contrary to the intentions of policy makers. Saks,
supra note 49, at 1288-89.
61. "Extreme power discrepancies breed arrogant and highhanded conduct. The doctrine of punitive
damages is one of the few remedies that can constrain a giant corporation that is willing and able to
take advantage of its less powerful 'adversaries."' Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical
Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269,
1277 (1993).
62. See Appendix A for an analysis of what damages would have been assessed against TXO in
each state with punitive damages legislation that employs a cap or multiplier.
63. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 19.
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egregious conduct when it is directed at them.
V. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES LEGISLATION
It may well be too late in the day to argue against the statutory reform to puni-
tive damages that have already taken place. The fact is that a majority of states have
undertaken some reform, albeit at different levels of intensity, and it is unlikely that
they will turn back the clock. Although we do suggest that those states that have
passed reform legislation reconsider the wisdom of limiting the effectiveness of puni-
tive damages, our proposal is directed primarily at those states that are contemplating a
change. The data and policies underlying punitive damages do not support many of the
reforms undertaken thus far. It is therefore important that future attempts be measured
and that they be undertaken with a clear understanding of the data and with the tradi-
tional policies supporting the award of punitive damages in mind.
A. Caps
It defies logic to impose a cap on punitive damages. An arbitrary cap set at a
fixed dollar amount suggests that we can put a price ex ante on outrageous behavior.
Caps do lend predictability, as argued by their proponents. However, the quest for
predictability hides the deterrent function of punitive damages.' In the extreme, a cap
provides an incentive for really outrageous behavior. A cap could incite the rational
actor to undertake a scheme or fraud that would net substantially more than the
amount of the cap. Indeed, it is precisely the lack of predictability that gives punitive
damages their deterrent effect. If an actor is contemplating insurance fraud or a scheme
to engage in insider trading and is put off of the deed by the unknowability of the
costs, then the law has performed its function elegantly. Thus, we conclude that caps
are inappropriate vehicles for controlling punitive damages and should be avoided.
B. Multipliers
Similarly, we assert that setting punitive damages as a multiple of compensatory
damages is equally inappropriate. Punitive damages have nothing to do with the
claimant's actual damages and confusing the two works great mischief. Compensatory
damages compensate and punitive damages punish and deter. The former focuses on
the claimant and the latter focus on the defendant's conduct. To create mathematical
formulae that tie one to the other ignores the punishment and deterrence function.'
Once again, the desire to predict and calculate has overcome the original purpose of
punitive damages. Using the TXO facts as an example, because TXO was unsuccessful
in its attempt to shake down Alliance for a smaller royalty payment, Alliance's actual
damages were very modest. However, the trier of fact clearly wished to send a mes-
sage to TXO and others similarly inclined that this conduct is intolerable. The message
is worth sending, whether or not the plaintiff has suffered great harm.
TXO talks about a reasonable relationship between the punitive award and the
harm.' The harm to which the Court refers is both the harm that would have oc-
curred had the defendants succeeded in their scheme and the harm that could occur in
64. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 36, at 666.
65. "Lopsided ratios between punitive and compensatory damages awards are often necessary for
the punishment and deterrence of powerful corporations." Rustad & Koenig, supra note 61, at 1277.
66. 113 S. Ct. at 2721.
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the future if similar conduct is not deterred. That is not to be confused with a relation-
ship between punitive and compensatory damages. TXO's conduct had great potential
to do harm; it is merely fortuitous that extensive harm did not occur. The trier of fact
must be free to consider what might have happened as a consequence of the
defendant's behavior, not only what did happen, and punish accordingly.
Procedural safeguards such as remittitur, judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and appeal exist to assure that fact finders do not go to extremes. Legislation that
duplicates existing safeguards is unnecessary and produces confusion about the law's
policies. We propose that future legislation, to permit punitive damages to fulfill their
traditional role, decouple the compensatory/punitive damages link that has been forged
in some states.
C. Burden of Proof
Many states have increased the burden of proving punitive damages beyond the
typical standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, either judicially or by
legislation. This reform does less violence to the original concept of punitive damages
than the others discussed. The conduct complained of in the usual punitive damages
case is nearly criminal in nature, as are the sanctioning purposes of punishment and
deterrence. Although it is not necessary to step up the proof to match that required in
criminal cases,' inasmuch as the action is civil, it can be argued that the unusual na-
ture of a punitive damages case justifies a heightened scrutiny of a plaintiff's allega-
tions.' If successfully asserted, the defendant will be penalized financially for her or
his conduct, above and beyond any harm caused to the plaintiff. The stakes can be
very high; it is therefore appropriate to put the plaintiff to an extra measure of proof.
Likewise, the movement toward clear and convincing evidence does not wreak a
significant hardship on the plaintiff. A plaintiff must establish that the defendant has
engaged in willful or wanton conduct, or maliciousness, or oppression, or fraud in
order to make a claim. If the conduct is truly egregious' and worthy of being pun-
ished, it is imperative that the. proof demonstrate that convincingly. Furthermore, it is
likely that the plaintiff with a legitimate claim can satisfy the requirement without
incurring much more of an onus than proof by a preponderance of the evidence impos-
es. Once the plaintiff can demonstrate a scheme of defalcation and trickery, the scheme
unravels and the proof easily meets the heightened standard. Therefore, we recommend
that those states that undertake reform in this area consider increasing the burden of
proof. It assures that punitive damages are limited to the extreme forms of behavior
they were designed to sanction.
D. Payment to the State
State extraction of a portion of a punitive damages award is a novel approach
67. But see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1989), which adopts proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
68. See William H. Volz & Michael C. Fayz, McBride v. General Motors: Judicial Response To
Constitutional Challenges In a Products Liability Punitive Damage Limitation Statute, 29 AM. Bus.
L.J. 367, 408-09 (1991).
69. Consider the "really stupid" and "really mean" characterization by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in TXO. 419 S.E.2d 870, 887-88 (W. Va. 1991). See supra note 24 for court's
language.
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taken by ten"0 states. Because the tactic does nothing to respond to concerns about the
amount of or occasions for making the award, it is-obviously designed to answer com-
plaints about the windfall punitive damages supply to plaintiffs. Unlike most of the
other criticisms leveled at punitive damages, the windfall argument is legitimate and
worthy of response. We see value in returning a portion of the award to the state as a
reasonable reaction to the windfall criticism. Therefore, we recommend that states
adopt laws requiring that seventy-five percent of any punitive damages award, after
deducting reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the plaintiff, be paid into the
state coffers. Rather than going to the general treasury, the state's portion of the award
should be earmarked for a special fund bearing a relationship to the harm. For exam-
ple, a product liability judgment could be earmarked for public health, and an award in
a consumer fraud case could be earmarked for consumer protection. If no suitable fund
exists, the amount could be applied to court administration.
The figure of seventy-five percent is the upward limit of statutes passed to date.
Although high, our recommendation of that figure is based on our attempt to respond
to the reality that punitive damages do not compensate-some would say overcompen-
sate-the plaintiff while, at the same time, preserving the incentive for plaintiffs to
pursue legitimate claims.
We are mindful of the constitutional implications of this proposal. Different
responses from Colorado," on the one hand, and Florida72 and Georgia73 on the
other, create confusion about the fate of this plan. Future appeals of the cases and the
initiation of others will provide more guidance. Obviously, attempts to construct a
statute along the lines we have proposed requires careful drafting to survive a constitu-
tional challenge.
E. Multiple Claims
A difficult question of the appropriateness of punitive damages arises when one
defendant is assessed over and over for harm arising out of the same conduct as differ-
ent plaintiffs bring their claims.74 Asbestos litigation provides a convenient example.
Asbestos producers argue, with juistification, that they should not be held liable for
punitive damages in multiple suits for failure to warn about the harmful effects of
asbestos. If the purpose of punitive damages truly is to deter and punish, then the first
suit, if it properly takes into account the nature of the conduct, the potential for harm,
and the amount necessary to discourage similar actions, adequately makes the point.
As with the windfall argument, we believe the overdeterrence argument has some
merit. In response, we propose that states limit punitive damages awards arising from a
single event to the first lawsuit and cut off subsequent claims. Inasmuch as punitive
damages do not compensate the plaintiff and only punish the defendant, it does not do
violence to plaintiffs' rights to limit awards to one." Furthermore, the proposal en-
70. Colorado's has been overturned. See Appendix A.
71. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
72. Gordon v. Florida, 608 So. 2d 800 (1992). The law now requires that 60% be paid to the
state.
73. Georgia v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (1993). cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994).
74. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 36, at 645; Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Chal-
lenging the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: Putting Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal
Remedy, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 485, 490 (1990). See also Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371, 1387 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that multiple awards do not violate substantive due process).
75. Missouri permits sums previously paid as punitive damages to be credited to an award arising
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courages a full hearing in the first suit to consider all the relevant criteria and set an
award that adequately performs the punishment and deterrence functions.
We recognize that this proposal, without more, does not adequately treat the
occurrence of multiple cases seeking punitive damages being prosecuted in different
states. Naturally, one state cannot legislate against actions being brought in other
states. The recommendation can succeed only if the plan achieves nearly universal
adoption. Therefore, as with all situations in which state variability allows for differing
results and, consequently, forum shopping, consensus among the states must be
achieved to assure consistency in implementing legislation. Alternatively, states could
refuse to entertain punitive damages claims if any other state has awarded them for the
same event (i.e., against a different plaintiff), so long as the first proceeding provided a
full hearing on the question of the adequacy of the damages. Obviously, a damage
award that was limited by a statutory cap or a multiplier would not satisfy the require- -
ment, nor would an amount paid in settlement. The approach is drastic, but gives states
a chance to sort out the issue of multiple claims until uniformity is achieved.
In summary, future statutory reforms in punitive damages should be more cir-
cumscribed than those that have occurred. Earlier attempts have ignored the reasons for
punitive damages and have, in our judgment, been driven .by incorrect assumptions. It
is time to put the data to good use. In this way, logical solutions can be crafted that
are not driven by rhetoric and anecdote. The future use of caps and multipliers should
be discouraged. Instead, reform efforts should be directed at increasing the burden of
proving punitive damages, devising ways to support and encourage socially responsible
behavior with the proceeds of such awards, and prohibiting multiple awards.
VI. CONCLUSION
States that have restricted defendants' exposure to punitive damages have acted
in response to the hysteria generated by business interests and tort reformers rather
than to any valid data about the business impact of punitive damages awards. The data
that do exist does not support critics' claims that punitive damages are routinely
awarded, awards are large, the size and frequency of the awards are increasing rapidly,
and the problem is a national one. State legislatures have, therefore, "solved" a prob-
lem that may not exist at all and certainly does not exist at the level of magnitude
charged by reformers. The statutes that they have passed have substantially limited or
eliminated an important and powerful weapon to deter business misconduct.
One of the primary purposes of exposing business to the risk of punitive dam-
ages has traditionally been to deter, both individually and collectively, conduct by
business that transcends the bounds of propriety. An essential element of the deterrent
function is the unpredictability of the risk: If a business cannot determine ex ante the
cost of engaging in misconduct, it cannot use a cost/benefit analysis to decide whether
it will be profitable to so act. Another important purpose of punitive damages is to
punish bad actors. If punitive damages are restricted to amounts that may be no more
than an annoyance to a business with deep pockets, they will barely merit the attention
of, let alone punish, the wrongdoer. In limiting business exposure to punitive damages,
out of the same conduct. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (Vernon Supp. 1993). See David G. Owen,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1258, 1325 (1976) for the propo-
sition that the first plaintiffs to bring their claims deserve disproportionate awards for their cost and
trouble.
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the state reform legislation passed to date largely ignores the goals of imposing such
damages.
Although it is probably too late to turn back the legislative clock, we encourage
those states that have acted to reconsider and propose that no caps or rules that set
punitive damages as multipliers of compensatory damages be set in those states that
have not already done so. We recognize, however, that there are legitimate criticisms
of the traditional punitive damages rules. These include that the preponderance of the
evidence standard is too lenient, that punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff,
and that permitting multiple awards for the same conduct is unfair and excessive pun-
ishment. To address these criticisms, we propose that the burden of proof be set at
clear and convincing evidence, that states extract seventy-five percent of the punitive
damages award, and that multiple awards be prohibited.
Punitive Damages: Appendix A
APPENDIX A
STATUTORY MEASURES RELATING To PUNITIVE DAMAGES
State Cap Excep- Clear & Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc-, State ed:Trial Outcome
the Cap ing
Evidence:
Alabama $250,000 Pattern or Ala. Code Cap
Ala. Code practice of § 6-11- won't
§ 6-11-21 wrongful 20(a) apply b/c
conduct, of pat-
actual tern or
malice, practice
libel, exception
slander,
defama-
tion
Alaska Alaska
Stat.§
09.17.020
Califor- Cal. Civil Cal. Civil
nia Code Code §
§ 3294(a) 3295
Colorado 1:1 Ct. may Beyond a Colo. $19,000
Colo. increase reasonable Rev. Stat. to
Rev. Stat. or de- doubt Ann. § $57,000,
Ann. § crease Colo. 13-21- depend-
13-21-102 under Rev. Stat. 102(4) ing on
certain Ann. § circum-
conditions 13-25- stances
but not 127(2)
beyond
3X actual
damages
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State cap Excep- Clear & Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc- State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap Ing
Evidence
Connect- In product N/A
icut liability
cases,
pun. dam-
ages can
not ex-
ceed 2X
comps.
Conn.
Gen. Stat.
Ann. §
52-240b
Florida 3:1 Class Fla. Stat. 35% $57,000,
Fla. Stat. actions or Ann. Fla. Stat. unless
Ann. if P is § 768.73 Ann. Alliance
§ 768.73 awarded § can show
more than Adopting 768.73(2) by C&C
3X actual C&C only [if pers. evidence
dams., it for injury or that pun.
is pre- awards wrongful award
sumed above death, was not
excesssive presump- money excessive
and P tive cap pd. to
must of 3X Public
show by comps. Med.
C&C Assis-
evidence tance
that it is Fund]
not
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State Cap Excep -: Clear &i Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc- State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap i ng
Evidence
Georgia $250,000 Product Ga. Code 75% Ga. Code
liability Ann. § (product Ann. §
Ga. Code actions 51-12- liability 51-12-
Ann. § and tort 5. 1 (b) verdicts 5.1(d)
51-12- cases only)
5.1(g) where it is
found D Ga. Code
acted with Ann. §
specific 51-12-
intent to 5.1 (e)(2)
cause
harm.
Ga. Code
Ann. §
51-12-5.1
(e) & (f)
Idaho No. Pre-
ponderanc
e of evid.
by statute
Idaho
Code § 6-
1604(1)
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State Cap Excep- Clear & ] Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc- State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap ing
Evidence
Illinois At ct.'s
discretion;
funds pd.
to Dept.
of
Rehabilita
-tive Ser-
vices.
Ill. Comp.
Stat.
Ann., ch.
735, art.
5, § 2-
1207
[formerly
Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch.
110, para
.2-1207]
Indiana Ind. Code
Ann. §
34-4-34-2
Iowa Iowa 75% to
Code Civil
§ 668A.1 Repara-
(1)(a) tions
Trust
Fund
Iowa
Code
§ 668A.1
(2)(b)
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State Cap Excep- Clear & Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to- 'Convinc- State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap .ing,
Evidence
Kansas Lesser of If ct. finds Kan. Stat. 50% of Kan. Stat. Undeter-
$5 million D expect- Ann. § awards Ann. § mined,
or D's ed to 60- made in 60- either $5
highest make 3702(c) med. mal. 3702(a) mill. or
gross w/i profit in cases. $7.5 to
last 5 yrs. excess of Kan. Stat. $12.5
Kan. Stat. cap, set Ann. § mill.,
Ann. § dams. at 60- based on
60- 1.5 X D's 3402(e) Alliance'
3701(e) expected [to state s figures
profit health
Kan. Stat. care]
Ann. 60-
3701(f).
Ken- Ky. Rev. Ky. Rev.
tucky Stat. Ann. Stat. Ann.
§ 411. § 411.186
184(2)
Mary- Md. Cts.
land & Jud.
Proc.
Code
Ann. §
10-913(a)
Minneso- Minn. Minn.
ta Stat. Ann. Stat. Ann.
§ 549.20 § 549.20
subd. 1(a) subd. 4,
upon
request
Missouri 50% Mo. Rev.
Mo. Rev. Stat.
Stat. §
§ 537. 510.263,
675(2) upon
request
Montana Mont. Mont.
Code Code
Ann. § Ann. §
27-1- 27-1-
221(5) 221(7)(a)
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State Cap Excep- Clear & Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc- State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap Ing
Evideice..
Nevada >$100,000 Prod. Nev. Rev. Nev. Rev. $300,000
then 3:1; liability Stat. Ann. Stat. Ann.
<$100,000 Housing § § 42.005
then max. discrim. 42.005(1) (3)
Toxic
= spills
$300,000 Defama-
Nev. Rev. tion
Stat. Ann. Bad Faith
§ re. Insur-
42.005(1) ance
Coverage
New For prod-
Jersey uct liabil-
ity only.
N.J. Stat.
Ann. §
2A:58C-5
North Greater of N.D. N.D.
Dakota 2:1 or Cent. Cent.
$250,000 Code § Code §
(N.D. 32-03.2- 32-03.2-
Cent. 11(1) & 11(2),
Code § (5) upon
32-03.2- request
11(4)
Ohio Ohio Rev. Ohio Rev.
Code Code
Ann. § Ann. §
2315. 2315.21
21(C)(3) (C)(2)
[damages
deter-
mined by
ct.]
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State Cap Excep- Clear & Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc- State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap ing
Evidence
Oklaho- 1:1 Ct. finds Okla. Cap
ma Okla. Stat. C&C Stat. Ann. won't
Ann. tit. evidence tit. 23, § apply if
23, § 9(A) of fraud, 9(A). C&C
oppres- evidence
sion, etc. Adopting found;
Okla. Stat. C&C for otherwise
Ann. tit. exceptions $19,000
23, Sec- to cap
tion 9(A).
Oregon Or. Rev. 50%,
Stat. after fees
§ Or. Rev.
41.315(1) Stat.
§ 18.540
[funds go
to Crim.
Injuries
Compen.
Account]
South S.C. Code
Carolina Ann. §
15-33-135
Texas Greater of Malice or Cap
$200,000 intent'l won't
or 4:1 tort apply b/c
Tex. Civ. Tex. Civ. of inten-
Prac. & Prac. & tional
Rem. Rem. tort
Code Code
Ann. § Ann. §
41.007 41.008
Journal of Legislation
State Cap Excep- Clear & Money to Bifurcat- TXO
tions to Convinc- ' State ed Trial Outcome
the Cap lug
Evidence
Utah Utah 50% in Utah
Code excess of Code
Ann. § $20,000 Ann. §
78-18- to gen. 78-18-
1(1)(a) fund 1(2)
Utah
Code
Ann. §
78-18-
1(3)
Virginia $350,000 No excep- $350,000
Va. Code tions
Ann.
§ 8.01-
38.1
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